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Abstract
This paper investigates the income eects of the South African Social
Pension. Using data from three waves of the the Labour Force Sur-
vey, we nd that there appears to be a signicant negative association
between labour supply and pension receipt. However, we nd little
evidence to support the view that these results can be interpreted as
pure income eects. Rather, the evidence suggests that the association
is driven by age-cohort eects, which we argue reects the burden of
living with the elderly. We also report preliminary evidence which is
suggestive of endogenous household formation in response to eligibility
for the social pension.
Keywords: public transfers, pensions, labour supply
1 Introduction
A lively debate has emerged recently on the possible behavioural responses
to the presence of pension income in the household, primarily in response to
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fessor, Department of Economics, Stellenbosch University and Honorary Research As-
sociate, SALDRU, School of Economics, University of Cape Town. We thank Justine
Burns, David Lam, Murray Leibbrandt and Martin Wittenberg for useful comments and
discussions. Support for this research was provided by the U.S. National Institute of
Child Health and Human Development (Grant R01HD045581). Comments can be sent to
keswell@cournot.sun.ac.zathe ndings made by Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller (2003), who showed
that receipt of social pensions were associated with signicantly negative
hours and employment elasticities. Key contributions here include Alderman
(1999), Posel, Fairburn and Lund (2005), and Ranchhod (2006). There is also
a large literature which has looked at broader eects; notably, on savings
behaviour, labour force status, nutritional status of dependents, household
size, and household structure. Few of these contributions attempt to speak
directly to the ndings of Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller (2003), yet
many contest the explicit interpretation provided by the authors that they
have found uncontrovertible evidence showing disincentive eects of the social
pension. In this paper, our goal is modest: we seek primarily to replicate the
methods and results of Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller (2003) in order to
more fully interrogate the interpretation they give to their ndings. Thus, we
examine whether pensions negatively aect labour supply within households
which have age-eligible members. However, unlike their study, we use more
recent data that come from the 2001 and 2002 Labour Force Survey. This
is an important consideration if the eects observed in earlier data capture
the shock of racial equalisation of the social pension rather than permanent
eects. To examine this possibility the rst part of our analysis recreates
almost exactly their techniques. To identify the eect of the social pension
we make use of the regression-discontinuity induced by the eligibility rules of
the old-age pension programme.
Our estimates of the hours elasticity with respect to pension income are
of the same sign as those found by Bertrand and colleagues, but are substan-
tially lower in magnitude (about 20% lower) than their estimates . When
subjected to a range of robustness tests, we nd strong evidence to suggest
that this eect is driven by age-cohort eects, which we interpret as evidence
not of pure income eects, but of the burden of living with the elderly. Our
interpretation appears to be further corroborated by changes in household
composition that appear to be driven by access to the social pension.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the standard
theory surrounding the debate over the labour market eects of public policy.
Section 3 provides an overview of the data and mean sample characteristics.
Section 4 presents the main results of the paper, while sections sections 5
and 6 deal with causal inference and interpretation respectively. Concluding
remarks are oered in section 7.
22 Neoclassical Theory of Labour Supply
2.1 Basic Framework
Consider the following canonical consumption-leisure framework. The deci-
sion over these goods are made by the agent as an outcome to the solution
of the following constrained utility maximisation problem:
Max U(G;L) such that PGG = PLH + V = PL(T   L) + V (1)
The agent's utility function depends on herlevel of consumption of goods
G, and hours of leisure L. This utility function is well behaved. U(G;L) is
twice dierentiable, where the rst derivatives (MUL = @U=@L and MUG =
@U=@G) are assumed to be positive, and the utility function is concave
(@2U=@L2 < 0, @2U=@L2 < 0 and @2U=@L@G > 0). We assume that the
agent spends all available income. Thus the amount spent on consumption
(price PGG), must equal the sum of non-wage income (V) and wage income
(PLH) where H is the number of hours spent working, and is related to
leisure as follows: L + H = T, where T is the maximum number of hours
available to the agent. The slope of the budget line is the real wage (PL=PG).
The optimal level of consumption and leisure is found where the marginal
rate of substitution of leisure for consumption goods (MUL=MUL) is equal
to the price ratio PL=PG, i.e. at the point of tangency between the agent's
budget line and the highest attainable indierence curve. At this point, the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is equal to
the slope of the budget line, i.e. the real wage. Equilibrium can occur ei-
ther at an interior solution point, where H > 0, and L < T, or at a corner
solution, where H = 0, and L = T. At the rst type of solution point, the
individual has made the decision to participate in the labour market, and has
then chosen an optimal level of labour to supply. At the second point, the
reservation wage w (the MRSLG) is higher than the market wage (the slope
of the budget line), and the agent decides not to participate in the labour
market.
32.2 Eects of an Increase in Non-Labour Income
2.2.1 First-Order Eects: pure income eect
When an individual receives extra non-wage income V (e.g. pension income)
the individual will tend to reduce labour supply, by substituting leisure for
labour, under several strict conditions. Workers make their labour supply
decisions based on information about wages, prices and non-wage income
(Killingsworth, 1983). Assuming that wage rates and relative prices remain
unaected, an increase in non-wage income will allow the worker to aord the
same bundle of goods, while working fewer hours. Under these conditions,
the agent realises a higher level of utility, brought on by an outward shift
of the budget line, resulting in a higher optimal choice of both leisure and
consumption. Only under these conditions will a rise in V translate into a
simple income eect, increasing consumption of both goods and leisure.
2.2.2 Second-Order Eects: reservation wages
Upon pension takeup, if the increase in non-wage income is not accompanied
by a corresponding change in wage rates, the pension recipient's reservation
wage will also unambiguously increase. This will tend to make the person
accept fewer job oers, as a greater proportion of these oers will not exceed
their reservation wage. The individual's bargaining power compared to that
of their prospective employer will have increased, as will their bargaining
power in the household.
2.2.3 Unobserved Heterogeneity in Preferences
Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller (2003) interpret their ndings as indica-
tive of pure income eects. It is intructive therefore to make clear what
assumptions are required for this interpretation to be valid. We have made
clear that a minimum requirement is that wage rates and prices must re-
main unchanged after the increase in non-wage income. However, even when
these conditions hold, empirically identifying pure income eects requires
very strong assumptions about preferences. An income eect might be non-
monotonic or of the wrong sign for a given agent, depending on the shape of
her indierence curve. If the individual has a preference for consumption (i.e.
work) we may observe an increase in their labour supply after an increase in
4non-labour income.1 Ruling out this possibility requires us to also rule out
potential non-convexities in agents' indierence maps.
A further consideration is unobserved heterogeneity of preferences. If
agents are assumed to dier according to their preferences, reservation wages,
and relative bargaining power within households, an increase in non-wage
income can have ambiguous aggregate eects. To illustrate, consider the fol-
lowing simple example: a male in the household reduces his supply of labour
in response to an improvement in his reservation wage. If one assumes that
the household operates according to the Unitary model, the implied compar-
ative statics would see his spouse (implicitly) reducing her reservation wage
in order to counter the loss of her partner's wage income, which in turn in-
duces her to enter the labour force. If some households operate more or less
according to this sort of \Arrow-Debreau" framework, while other households
are better described say according to a \Separate Spheres" model, the over-
all eect of unearned income on labour supply cannot be separated from the
eects of intra-household allocation. To be sure, there is no way to generalise
a pure income eect (like that proposed in the simple model of individual
labour supply outlined above), without providing an explicit account of in-
trahousehold bargaining over resources. Without such renements, all that
the model predicts (under those very strict conditions mentioned above) is
an eect on one's own choice of work hours.
As we shall see in a moment, the data do allow a test of the externality
eects of increases in non-labour income, but without a full account of the
bargaining process underlying these observations, it is unclear whether any
changes one might observe can be attributed to the eect of the income per
se, or other unaccounted for factors.
3 Data and Summary Statistics
Our analysis is based on two waves of the Labour Force Survey { September
2001 and 2002. Two possible measures of work hours are permitted by the
1One way in which this might play out in South Africa is that upon reaching eligibility,
pensioners may not wish to lose the prestige, and weight in household decision making that
being the primary earner conveys. This preference in turn might be driven by the view
that leisure is to be regarded as an inferior good when the individual has been unemployed
for many years. Indeed, job satisfaction, pride in providing for family and other similar
eects may all contribute to non-standard preferences regarding the choice of work over
leisure (Killingsworth, 1983).
5LFS: \the usual number of hours worked in a week", and \the number of
hours worked in the previous week". We make use of the second measure,
following Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller (2003) (hereafter BMM), in
order to facilitate comparison between our results and theirs.
The sample used includes African individuals, who are of prime working
age, and who live in three-generation households. Our denition of what
constitutes a three generation household is somewhat dierent to that em-
ployed by BMM. Whereas the PSLSD data used by BMM permitted a direct
assesment of whether households contains members of 3 distinct generations
(i.e., grandparents, their children, and their grandchildren), this is not possi-
ble with the LFS. We therefore proxy three-generation households by using
the yardstick of 30 years being equal to a generation. Thus in our analysis
a household is deemed to be a three-generation household if it contained at
least one member thirty years old or younger, plus one member in the 30-60
age cohort, and one member aged 60 and above. The sample is then trun-
cated to only those individuals who are of prime working age (i.e., between
the ages of 16 and 50 years).
Table 1 presents summary statistics relating to eligible and ineligible
households, where eligibility is dened as whether a household contained
a male aged 65 and above or a female aged 60 and above. Table 1 shows that
there are statistically signicant dierences between eligible and non-eligible
households on many of the observables. Of particular interest is the nding
that average age in eligible households is about 2 years lower than average
age in ineligible households. This is a key dierence between our sample and
the 1993 PSLSD data used by BMM. Later we will examine whether this
information is instructive about how to interpret our results.
We nd a higher rate of employment in pension ineligible households,
and thus higher average hours worked and lower rates of unemployment.
Eligible households have a 16.9% rate of employment, compared to 36.5%
for ineligible households. This is a remarkable dierence compared to that
which is observed by BMM for Africans in three-generation households in
the PSLSD. In part this is not all that surprising given what is now known
about the rise in (involuntary) unemployment in the 1990s.
The strict unemployment rate for prime working-age individuals living in
three generation households is nearly three times higher than the correspond-
ing gure for for 1993, at 20.9%. In eligible households, strict unemployment
is 25.3%, compared to 19.2% for ineligible households. This is partly a feature
of the large proportion of eligible households who live in rural areas (58.5%
6compared to 48.9% of ineligible households). Those in eligible households
are more likely to act as safety nets for unemployed relatives (Klasen and
Woolard (2000)), as seen by the much larger size of these households. The
exclusion of migrant workers from the household in the Labour Force Survey
also contributes to the larger unemployment rate in these households.
Weekly work hours (main job and other activities) are also higher than
what was observed in the PSLSD data. Average hours worked in a week for
individuals residing in both types of households is 27.5 hours, which is much
higher than the levels found in the PSLSD data (an increase of between 3
and 6 times depending on the type of household). Eligible households have
much lower labour supply than ineligible households (17.8 hours compared to
30.3 for ineligible households), and much greater dierences in the number of
employed people in the household. Pension eligible households have slightly
higher levels of discouraged workers (7.1%) although the general level is low
(6.4% in all households). The number of discouraged workers is about a third
lower than that recorded in the PSLSD.
Individuals living in pension eligible households have slightly lower levels
of education, which could support the hypothesis that pension income may
induce migration, leaving households with less employable individuals. Posel
and Casale (2002) nd that for African female workers, an extra year of
education raised the probability of migration by 3%. Only 22 percent of all
prime working age Africans have completed matric, although this is roughly
ten percentage points higher than the levels recorded in 1993. As expected,
eligible households are much larger, and have lower income levels, than those
households with no eligible elderly. Household size has fallen considerably
since 1993. In all households, it fell by approximately 3 members. This could
reect increased migration since 1993. African three generation households
have moved from living in predominantly rural areas (68% in 1993) to a more
even split between rural and urban locations in 2001 (51% of all individuals
live in rural areas).
The mean pension income in eligible households is close to the value of the
state pension in 2001, or R640. Pension income plays a large role in eligible
households. About 36% of household income in these households consists of
pension income. Most pension income enters the household through female
pensioners, as a much higher proportion of eligible women are present in
these households than men. This pattern has not changed signicantly since
1993. This stems from the eligibility rule, and the tendency of women to live
longer than men.
74 Basic Results
We now present the key regression results of the eect of pension receipt
on labour supply and employment. Equations (2) and (3) show the main
equations of interest in this analysis.
h = x1 + 1y + u1 (2)
z = x2 + 2y + u2 (3)
h measures reported hours worked per week (including overtime and hours
spent on other work for pay); z is an employment dummy that takes a value
of one if the individual is employed, and is zero if strictly unemployed; and
y is a pension variable. Following BMM, we use two pension measures {
household pension income and household pension eligibility, where the latter
is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the household has at least one
person who is eligible for the state pension. Arguably, the second pension
measure is the better of the two as it provides exogenous variation in pension
income induced by the eligibility rules, whereas the income measure itself is
counfounded potentially by endogenous take-up of the pension.
The vector x represents covariates. It contains the following individual
level variables: a quartic in age (measured in years); binary variables for
gender; a binary variable for whether matric has been completed or not;
binary variables for location; the number of children in dierent age cohorts
present in the household (ages 0-5, 6-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24); binary variables
for provinces (the base category is the Western Cape); and a household size
variable measured as the number of present household members.2 These
regressions are also run separately for men and women.
Preliminary estimates of equations (2) and (3) are presented in table 2 (see
table 3 for a summary of these same regressions run separately by gender).
The coecient on household pension income has been multiplied by a factor
of 1000, hence the coecient in column one of -6.635 implies that an increase
of household pension income of a thousand rand is associated with a fall in
individual labour supply of 6.635 hours per week. Columns 1 to 3 report OLS
estimates of the labour supply equation, while columns 4 to 6 report OLS
2Changes in household structure due to pension receipt may imply that household
size should be modeled endogenously. As the eects on household composition are our
secondary focus, we make this simplifying assumption in the rst part of the analysis.
However, we revisit this issue below when discussing causal inference.
8estimates for employment status. Maximum likelihood estimates of these
identical regressions are presented in tables 4 and 5. While there are some
interesting dierences between the linear and non-linear model specications,
we will not focus on these as we cannot make a comparison of such ndings
against those of BMM. For most of what follows therefore, we will restrict
our attention to the results reported in tables 2 and 3.
One of our objectives is to investigate the implied elasticities associated
with the estimated eects of pension income. However, our binary measure
of the pension variable (which we use in the regressions reported in columns
2 and 5) is not useful for such a purpose. For this reason, we also provide
instrumental variable (IV) estimates of pension income. The advantage of
this approach is that it allows us to use a pension measure that is continuous
(thus permitting the calculation of an elasticity) while exploiting the exoge-
nous variation provided by the eligibility rules (as in the measure adopted in
columns 2 and 5). Our IV is measured by summing all men and women in the
household who are eligible to receive a social pension.3 Since the number of
eligible men and women in the household is strongly correlated with the level
of household pension income, these variables pass a neccesary condition to be
considered valid IVs.4 To the extent that household size (and composition)
is orthogonal to individual labour supply, which we assume to be true for the
moment, then the IV also meets the sucient condition of redundancy in the
labour supply and employment equations. These IV estimates are reported
in columns 3 and 6 of tables 2 to 5.
Our results are similar to those of BMM for both the hours worked and
employment status models, though the eect on hours is stronger than on
employment. Living in a pension eligible household reduces hours worked by
7.7 hours, or employment probability by 15.6%. An increase of household
pension income of a thousand rand reduces hours worked by 8.5 hours and
employment probability by 17.3%. As in BMM, the non-instrumented results
underestimate the eect of pension income on hours worked and employment
probability. The absolute values of these coecients are much lower than
the estimates for 1993 (12.3 and 17.0 respectively). In contrast however, the
employment probability coecients have increased since 1993.
If we accept this IV strategy as valid, what sort of economic magnitudes
3Using estimates based on income measures of the pension (whether instrumented or
not) are easier to work with in terms of converting to elasticities.
4These variables are signicant at the one percent level in the reduced form equation
for pension income (not reported here).
9does pension income translate into, in terms of forgone earnings due to the
reduction in work hours? To get a sense of this, we calculate the (pension)
income elasticities of labour supply and employment probability. Table 6
shows a comparison of the 1993 and 2001 hours worked and employment
probability income elasticities. On average there are 1.9 prime working age
people in a three-generation African household.5 Thus if individual income
rises by R1000, hours worked drops by -8.512 * 1.9 which is a drop of -16.17
hours per week. Average hours in a pension eligible household are 44.69
(conditional on working), and average individual income is 974 (per prime
working age individual in the household). Thus an elasticity of hours to
income is -8.512 * 1.9 *(0.974/44.69) = -0.35. The elasticity for employment
is similarly calculated as -0.173 * 1.9 *(0.974/0.311) = -1.03. If we are to
believe these results, it would suggest that the labour supply elasticity has
fallen since the 1993 gure of -0.53, while the employment elasticity has
almost doubled in size from -0.55 in 1993. Although we do not attempt
to explore the reasons for this change, if these magnitudes are correct, one
hypothesis for such a dramatic increase in the negative employment elasticity
is the rise in labour market participation witnessed recently.
Table 3 presents a gendered breakdown of these results. Of note is the
nding that men are aected much more than women by living in a pension
eligible household. In column 3 we notice that an extra thousand rand of
pension income reduces male hours worked by 12.525 hours per week, while
having a matric has only a small positive eect on male work hours (1.847).
By contrast, education seems to play almost as strong a role in explaining
labour supply for women. These coecients translate in pension income elas-
ticities of -0.52 and -0.17 for men and women respectively and employment
elasticities of -1.37 and -0.65 for men and women respectively.6 It appears
that male labour supply and employment elasticities have not changed re-
markably since 1993, with a slight drop in labour supply elasticity, and a
small increase in the employment probability elasticity. For women however,
labour supply elasticity has reduced to a third of the size, and the employ-
5According to BMM, the PSLSD contains on average 4.7 prime-age African workers
per three-generation household. Household size has also fallen signicantly since 1993.
The percentage of prime age workers in households in 1993 and 2001 was 51% and 25%
respectively.
6Hours worked elasticities: -12.525 * 1.9 *(0.974/44.69) and -4.208 * 1.9 *(0.974/44.69).
Employment elasticities: Men -0.230 * 1.9 *(0.974/0.311) and Women -0.109 * 1.9
*(0.974/0.311).
10ment probability elasticity has increased more than four times. 7
5 Is the Pure Income Eect Identied?
The validity of the above identication strategy rests on two key assump-
tions: (i) that the IV is (suciently) correlated with pension income; and
(ii) that it is redundant in the labour supply and employment probability
equations. The rst of these assumptions is testable and we saw from the
results discussed in section 4 that it was supported by the data. The second
assumption on the other hand is untestable { if there are other unobservable
variables that it turns out to be correlated with, the assumption will not
hold and the endogeneity problem will remain unresolved. This possibility
is eectively equivalent to a failure of the redundancy assumption. There-
fore a quick test of identication is to look for systematic dierences between
the members of pension-eligible and pension-ineligible households that might
conceivably be correlated with our IV. Stated dierently, if we can conceive
of reasons for why the variable number of age-eligible men and women in a
household should be included in either equation 1 or 2, then the identifcation
strategy is no longer valid.
A key result of Posel, Fairburn, and Lund (2006) is that household pen-
sion receipt is correlated with household in-migration of younger women with
fewer skills, and household out-migration of older, prime age working women
with more experience. From table 1, we see that the average age in eligi-
ble households is signicantly lower, and the strict rate of unemployment is
higher. Eligible households are also comparatively bigger. While we cannot
ascribe a causal relation between these variables and take-up, if (the an-
ticipation) of take-up of the pension induces shifts in household composition
(i.e., if household composition and size is endogenous to pension take-up) the
BMM identication strategy is weakened, if not invalidated. At best we will
not be able to separate the pension eect or other correlated or contextual
eects.
In this section we repeat the confoundedness experiment presented in
BMM by exploiting the eligibility rules more directly to construct regres-
sion discontinuity estimates of the pension eect. Although the local-average
treatment eect here is not of direct interest (as it only tells us about the
7The elasticities reported in BMM for hours worked are: -0.66 men and -0.43 women,
and employment probability: -0.98 men and -0.14 women. See their table 10.
11eects of the pension in the neighbourhood of the discontinuity) the one ad-
vantage of doing this exercise is that it allows an indirect assessment of the
plausibility of the IV estimates, The basic idea is that if the eects of the
pension reported in table 2 are true eects, then we would expect to observe
a large drop in average hours worked for individuals living with elderly people
that are close to or at the eligibility threshold, but not for those individuals
who live with elderly people just below the threshold. To implement this,
we contruct a disaggregated version of the IV used above. We do this for
men and women 50 and above in 5-year cohort intervals. These variables will
be used together with binary variables that capture whether there are any
ineligible elderly in the household as well as whether there are any eligible
elderly in the household.
Before proceeding to the results, it is important to point out that we need
to make sure that we account for deviations from the eligibility rule, since
identication is driven entirely by these rules. Following BMM, the deviation
from the eligibility rule in the region measures the percentage of people who
live in households which receive pension income where men between the
ages of 60 and 65 are present, and no other eligible elderly in the household
are present. This is a provincial level variable which reects the extent to
which the eligibility rules are strictly enforced in a given province. We would
expect delivery to be standardised in the provinces by 2001. In 1993 a not
insignicant fraction of people reported receiving the pension despite not
having reached the correct age for their gender. Case and Deaton (1998)
nd that approximately a quarter of men between 60 and 65, and a tenth
of women between 55 and 60 report receiving a pension. An important
question that arises out of this nding is the extent to which this deviation is
due to the mis-measurement of age as opposed to active deviation from the
implementation of the eligibility rules by public ocials administering the
pension at a local level. We use the method reported by Case and Deaton
(1998) to ne-tune our estimate of the proportion of deviant recipients for
the 2001 Labour Force Survey. This method lowers the estimate considerably
to approximately 0.5% of men, and 0.42% of women within 5 years of 65 and
60 respectively, who are receiving a pension illegally. We then construct a
deviation variable from these estimates and include it as an additional control
in the nal specication (column 6) we report in table 7.
We nd a negative eect of the presence of eligible elderly on hours worked
in columns 1a and 1b in table 7, where the presence of an eligible elderly
person in the household reduces individual hours worked by between 7.7 and
129.5 hours. These eects are similar in size to the coecients found in table
2. As in 1993, the presence of a non-eligible elderly person in the household
has no signicant negative eect on hours worked. On the face of it, this
would seem to suggest that the IV estimates are valid.
However a more disaggregated analysis of this variable reveals otherwise.
The most interesting nding, and a key point of departure between our results
and those of BMM, is the fact that non-eligible elderly women appear to
reduce their labour supply well in advance of becoming eligible for the pension
(witness the statistically signicant coecient of -0.70 on Women in the
household 50-55). We take this to mean that the key results reported in
BMM tables 2-4, and our replications thereof (tables 2, 3 and 7) do not
identify pure income eects of the social pension. To be clear, such eects
may very well be present, but to our knowledge, there have not been any
successful attempts at cleanly seperating the negative income elasticity of
the pension, from other eects having to do with living with elderly people.
Our results seem to suggest that individuals living with elderly african women
who are not old enough (in some instances, ten years too young) to receive a
state pension also work fewer hours than individuals without such persons in
their household. This suggests that at least some part of the negative eect
on hours worked (and by extension, the large negative elasticities attributed
to the social pension) have to do with the unobserved burden of living with
the elderly.
6 Discussion and Future Directions
The preceeding section suggested that the negative elasticities reported should
not be interpresetd as pure income eects of the pension, since an apparently
signicant negative eect of the social pension on work hours is detected even
before the age of eligibility, which seems to increase monotonically after the
age of eligibility. We intrepreted this evidence as the pension variable reect-
ing at least partly the burden of living with the elderly. In this section, we
explore whether part of the explanation might relate to out-migration once
someone in the household reaches the age of eligibility. Our intuition here is
motivated by the ndings of Posel, Fairburn, and Lund (2006) which we nd
intuitively compelling.
To investigate this, we exploit the panel structure of the LFS, albeit in
a limited way, by using the two waves of the LFS as a pooled cross-section.
13Our ultimate objective is to seperate temporal shifts in household size, from
spatial shifts (where space is here dened as eligible versus ineligible house-
holds). What follows is a rst attempt at investigating whether such an
endeavor is worth undertaking: i.e., are the dierences in mean household
sizes we observe between the two cross-sections, a) statistically signicant,
and b) statistically signicant when conditioned on household eligibility?
To accomplish this, we employ the following double-dierence estimator
of household size:
size = 0 + 0Time + 1z + 1Time  z + u (4)
Time is equal to unity in 2002; size measures household size; z is equal
to one if there is a positive number of pension eligible people in the house-
hold. 0 captures the eect of time on changes in household size over the
two periods, for both groups eligible and ineligible; 1 captures the eect of
eligibility on average household size; and 1 is the main coecient of inter-
est. If this coecient is signicant, then there are signicant dierences in
household size, between eligible and ineligible households, having accounted
for temporal changes in size.
The results of these preliminary investigations indicate that household size
is bigger for eligible households, and the change in household size for eligible
households is bigger than the corresponding change in ineligible households.8
Also, both changes are negative { both types of households are seeing mem-
bers exit from the household, although more exit from eligible households.
This is consistent with the ndings of Posel, Fairburn, and Lund (2006) al-
though we would caution against a causal interpretation at this point: i.e.,
that becoming eligible for the pension causes out-migration of prime-age
working women. Such a conclusion, of course, is only possible where we can
observe a change in eligibility status for both eligible and ineligible status.9
Having noted this caveat, we nd 1 =  0:13. This implies that controlling
for the eect of time, eligible households tend to be on average 13% smaller
and this dierence is statistically signicant. While these ndings need to
be veried for the dynamic case, taken together with our ndings discussed
in section 5, it would seem that the assumption of exogenous household
8The tables on which these dierences are based are not included here but are available
on request from the authors.
9Stated dierently, we cannot rule out selection bias is when both counterfactuals
(mean household size for eligible and ineligible households in alternative states of the
world) cannot be computed.
14size is deserving of further study. If these patterns turn out to be true for
the dynamic case, it would suggest that the BMM identication strategy is
invalid.
7 Conclusion
We nd that although there appears to be a signicant negative association
between labour supply and pension receipt, our results are much smaller
than those reported in previous work. We also nd little evidence to support
the view that these results can be interpreted as pure income eects. The
discrepency between our ndings and those of Bertrand, Mullainathan, and
Miller (2003) suggests that their work on the subject might have been cap-
turing short term eects of the pension (such as the shock induced through
racial equalisation). While it is clear that further research is required in order
to pin down the causal mechanisms at work, we have argued that what might
appear to be pure income eects of the social pension are potentially con-
ated by the eect of living with the elderly as well as changes in household
composition driven by access to the social pension.
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16Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
All Eligible Ineligible
Variable Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D
Age 29.5 9.9 27.9 9.2 30.1 10.1
Employed 0.311 0.463 0.169 0.374 0.365 0.481
Hours Worked 27.53 26.79 17.84 25.05 30.34 26.62
Unemployed 0.209 0.407 0.253 0.435 0.192 0.394
Discouraged 0.065 0.247 0.072 0.258 0.063 0.242
4th grade or more 0.885 0.319 0.890 0.312 0.883 0.321
8th grade or more 0.646 0.478 0.655 0.475 0.643 0.479
Matric or more 0.221 0.415 0.214 0.410 0.223 0.416
Household Size 5.81 3.38 7.64 3.83 5.14 2.92
Rural 0.508 0.500 0.580 0.494 0.482 0.500
Total Income 1930 2663 1849 2276 1949 2744
Pension Income 233 409 662 460 53 197
No of Eligible Women 0.230 0.442 0.866 0.429 0 0
No of Eligible Men 0.088 0.286 0.330 0.478 0 0
Note: Eligible households refer to those households that contain at least one pension eligible person,
i.e. one man over the age of 64 or one woman over the age of 59). Ineligible households refer to
households with no pension eligible members. The sample is further restricted to African individuals
that are of prime working age (between 16 and 50 years of age), and who live in three-generation households.
17Table 2: Eect of Pension Income on Hours Worked and Employment Prob-
ability
Hours Worked Employment Status
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
Pension Pension Pension Pension
Uptake Eligibility Uptake Eligibility
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pension Income x 1000 -6.635 { -8.512 -0.136 { -0.173
(0.652) { (0.780) (0.013) { (0.015)
Household Eligibility { -7.702 { { -0.156 {
{ (0.560) { { (0.011) {
Female -5.610 -4.393 -5.648 -0.079 -0.053 -0.079
(0.446) (0.404) (0.412) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Age -20.052 -22.356 -20.316 -0.523 -0.679 -0.528
(4.952) (4.511) (5.065) (0.096) (0.090) (0.094)
Age2 0.975 1.126 0.989 0.025 0.033 0.025
(0.235) (0.212) (0.240) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Age3 -0.019 -0.023 -0.019 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age4 x 1000 0.132 0.164 0.134 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.036) (0.032) (0.036) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Matric or more 2.475 1.586 2.475 0.070 0.052 0.070
(0.474) (0.445) (0.465) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
R2 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.15
n 14484 18307 14484 14491 18318 14491
Note: Hours worked is measured per week, and Employment Status is equal to 1 if the person is
employed, and 0 if unemployed. In columns 3 and 6 we instrument for endogenous household pension
income using the number of eligible men and women present in the household as instruments. The
coecient on household pension income has been multiplied by a factor of 1000. Hence the coecient
in column one of -6.635 implies that an increase of household pension income of a thousand rand is
associated with a fall in individual labour supply of 6.635 hours per week. An increase in household
pension income of a R1000 reects the eect of the addition to the household of between one and two
pensioners. Standard errors have been corrected for clustering within households and are reported below
the regression coecients in parentheses. The list of explanatory variables includes binary variables for
the number of children in the dierent age groups present in the household (ages 0-5, 6-15, 16-18, 19-21,
22-24), and indicator variables for province and rural/urban location. Household size is also included.
The sample is restricted to African individuals who are of prime working age (between 16 and 50 years
of age), and who live in three-generation households.
18Table 3: Gender Eect of Pension Income on Hours Worked and Employment
Probability
Hours Worked Employment Status
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
Pension Pension Pension Pension
ActualEligibile ActualEligibile
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Men
Pension Income x 1000 -9.730 {-12.525 -0.186 { -0.230
(0.916) {(1.131) (0.017) {(0.021)
Household Eligibility { -10.198 { { -0.186 {
{ (0.798) { { (0.015) {
Matric or more 1.856 1.273 1.847 0.058 0.046 0.057
(0.705) (0.636)(0.696) (0.013) (0.011)(0.013)
R2 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.12
No Obs 7157 9096 7157 7164 9108 7164
Women
Pension Income x 1000 -3.542 { -4.208 -0.084 { -0.109
(0.788) {(1.067) (0.017) {(0.020)
Household Eligibility { -5.141 { { -0.123 {
{ (0.686) { { (0.014) {
Matric or more 3.043 1.767 3.045 0.083 0.058 0.083
(0.600) (0.578)(0.617) (0.012) (0.011)(0.012)
R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.18 0.19
n 7327 9211 7327 7327 9210 7327
19Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Eect of Pension Income on
Hours Worked and Employment Probability
Hours Worked Employment Status
Tobit Tobit IV Probit Probit IV
Pension Pension Pension Pension
Uptake Eligibility Uptake Eligibility
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pension Income x 1000 -8.087 { -19.072 -0.162 { -0.200
(0.813) { (1.644) (0.016) { (0.017)
Household Eligibility { -9.548 { { -0.172 {
{ (0.713) { { (0.012) {
Female -5.687 -4.455 -10.928 -0.091 -0.062 -0.091
(0.478) (0.444) (0.836) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Age -27.872 -31.715 -53.744 -0.570 -0.722 -0.576
(5.912) (5.472) (10.582) (0.116) (0.103) (0.110)
Age2 1.377 1.590 2.657 0.027 0.035 0.028
(0.273) (0.252) (0.497) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age3 -0.027 -0.032 -0.053 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age4 x 1000 0.194 0.234 0.375 0.004 0.005 0.003
(0.039) (0.037) (0.074) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Matric or more 3.049 2.141 5.824 0.080 0.061 0.080
(0.518) (0.494) (0.949) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04 { 0.12 0.13 0.12
% correctly predicted { { { 67.4% 70.1% 73%
n 14484 18307 14484 14491 18318 14491
Dependent variables are same as in tables 2 and 3. Hours Worked equation estimated with Tobit model instead of
OLS. Employment Status equation estimate with Probit model rather than the OLS. IV is measured in the same
way as in tables 2-3. Standard errors (in parentheses) have been corrected for within-household clustering. Pseudo
R2 measures refers to McFadden's pseudo R2 measure. The probit coecients in column 4 and 5 are marginal
eects, calculated at the means for continuous variables, and dierential changes for binary explanatory variables.
Tobit results in columns 1 through 3 are also marginal eects: partial derivatives of the expected value of hours
worked with respect to the vector of characteristics, computed at the means of the explanatory variables. The
Probit IV and Tobit IV estimation follows the method of Newey (1987). The coecients in column 3 and 6 are
not corrected for cluster eects.
20Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Gender Eect of Pension
Income on Hours Worked and Employment Probability
Hours Worked Employment Status
Tobit Tobit IV Probit Probit IV
Pension Pension Pension Pension
Uptake Eligibility Uptake Eligibility
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Men
Pension Income x 1000 -11.945 { -25.632 -0.214 { -0.257
(1.211) { (2.266) (0.021) { (0.023)
Household Eligibility { -12.310 { { -0.201 {
{ (1.027) { { (0.016) {
Matric or more 2.407 1.763 4.198 0.064 0.053 0.064
(0.766) (0.708) (1.329) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.04 { 0.10 0.13 0.09
% correctly predicted { { { 65.7% 70.2% 72%
No Obs 7157 9096 7157 7164 9108 7164
Women
Pension Income x 1000 -4.505 { -11.219 -0.104 { -0.130
(0.939) { (2.371) (0.020) { (0.024)
Household Eligibility { -6.806 { { -0.139 {
{ (0.852) { { (0.016) {
Matric or more 3.663 2.437 7.686 0.099 0.070 0.099
(0.647) (0.638) (1.349) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.03 { 0.15 0.14 0.15
% correctly predicted { { { 69.5% 70.0% 74%
No Obs 7327 9211 7327 7327 9210 7327
21Table 6: Hours Worked and Employment Probability Elasticities
Hours Employment
All
1993 OLS -0.53 -0.55
2001 OLS -0.35 -1.03
2001 MLE -1.98 -1.19
Men
1993 OLS -0.66 -0.98
2001 OLS -0.52 -1.37
2001 MLE -1.06 -1.53
Women
1993 OLS -0.43 -0.14
2001 OLS -0.17 -0.65
2001 MLE -0.46 -0.77
Estimates for 1993 are from Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller (2003) whereas
estimates for 2001 are based on own calculations from table 2 which uses the Labour
Force Survey.
22Table 7: Eect of Living with the Elderly on Labour Supply (Regression
Discontinuity Design)
Variable OLS MLE OLS MLE OLS MLE OLS MLE
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (4a) (4b) (6a) (6b)
Eligible Elderly in HH -7.702 -9.548 { { { { { {
(0.560)(0.713) { { { { { {
NonEligible Elderly in HH -0.556 -0.731 { { { { { {
(0.910)(0.948) { { { { { {
Persons in HH 50-55 { { -0.347 -0.423 -0.332 -0.408 { {
{ {(0.181)(0.202)(0.182)(0.203) { {
Women in HH 50-55 { { { { { { -0.701 -0.836
{ { { { { { (0.259) (0.284)
Men in HH 50-55 { { { { { { 0.037 0.005
{ { { { { { (0.284) (0.317)
Persons in HH 55-60 { { -0.144 -0.163 -0.123 -0.141 { {
{ {(0.204)(0.233)(0.206)(0.234) { {
Women in HH 55-60 { { { { { { -0.407 -0.483
{ { { { { { (0.307) (0.346)
Men in HH 55-60 { { { { { { 0.142 0.191
{ { { { { { (0.336) (0.375)
Persons in HH 60-65 { { -0.456 -0.506 -0.537 -0.606 { {
{ {(0.214)(0.238)(0.225)(0.250) { {
Women in HH 60-65 { { { { { { -0.962 -1.091
{ { { { { { (0.287) (0.325)
Men in HH 60-65 { { { { { { -0.432 -0.604
{ { { { { { (1.282) (1.386)
n6065m X deviation from { { { { { { 16.422 21.421
eligibility rule in region { { { { { {(37.300)(40.339)
Persons in HH over 65 { { -0.840 -0.955 { { { {
{ {(0.144)(0.162) { { { {
Persons in HH 65-70 { { { { -0.463 -0.530 { {
{ { { {(0.254)(0.280) { {
Women in HH 65-70 { { { { { { -0.682 -0.817
{ { { { { { (0.335) (0.368)
Men in HH 65-70 { { { { { { -0.087 -0.064
{ { { { { { (0.450) (0.512)
Persons in HH over 70 { { { { -0.866 -0.982 { {
{ { { {(0.185)(0.207) { {
Women in HH over 70 { { { { { { -1.185 -1.435
{ { { { { { (0.254) (0.285)
Men in HH over 70 { { { { { { -0.192 -0.072
{ { { { { { (0.337) (0.375)
R2 0.14 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.13 0.04
Note: All reported MLE estimates are marginal eects for the tobit model. The R2 value for the tobit models is an
Anova Based Fitness Measure. Tobit results have been corrected for heteroscedasticity. Coecients in parentheses
refer to robust standard errors corrected for within-household correlation in hours worked. The regressions contain
the same additional regressors as in table 2.
23The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit
The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) conducts research 
directed at improving the well-being of South Africa’s poor. It was established in 1975. Over 
the next two decades the unit’s research played a central role in documenting the human 
costs of apartheid. Key projects from this period included the Farm Labour Conference 
(1976), the Economics of Health Care Conference (1978), and the Second Carnegie Enquiry 
into Poverty and Development in South Africa (1983-86). At the urging of the African Na-
tional Congress, from 1992-1994 SALDRU and the World Bank coordinated the Project for 
Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD). This project provide baseline data 
for the implementation of post-apartheid socio-economic policies through South Africa’s ﬁrst 
non-racial national sample survey. 
 
In the post-apartheid period, SALDRU has continued to gather data and conduct research 
directed at informing and assessing anti-poverty policy.   In line with its historical contribution, 
SALDRU’s researchers continue to conduct research detailing changing patterns of well-
being in South Africa and assessing the impact of government policy on the poor.  Current 
research work falls into the following research themes:  post-apartheid poverty; employment 
and migration dynamics; family support structures in an era of rapid social change; public 
works and public infrastructure programmes, ﬁnancial strategies of the poor; common prop-
erty resources and the poor.  Key survey projects include the Langeberg Integrated Family 
Survey (1999), the Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey (2000), the ongoing Cape Area Panel 
Study (2001-) and the Financial Diaries Project. 
Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit
School of Economics
University of Cape Town
Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701
Cape Town, South Africa
Tel: +27 (0) 21 650 5696
Fax: +27 (0) 21 650 5697
Email: brenda.adams@.uct.ac.za
Web: www.saldru.uct.ac.za
School of Economics
UNIVERSITY OF 
CAPE TOWN
SALDRU